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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Financially destitute and homeless, a man began to sob after receiving a 
speeding ticket.1 When the man refused to sign the ticket, the ticketing 
officer arrested the man.2 The officer placed the man in handcuffs and 
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D. anticipated 2010, University of Florida Levin College of Law. This Note is dedicated 
to Patricia Fabian. I would like to thank both Patricia and Kate for all their patience, love, and 
support. I would also like to thank the members of the Florida Law Review for all their hard work 
and support. It has been an honor and a pleasure to serve as an editor on the Review. My colleagues 
are truly inspiring. 
 1. Buckley v. Haddock, 292 F. App’x 791, 792 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 2. Id. 
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began leading him to the patrol car.3 As the two walked towards the patrol 
car, the man went limp and fell to the ground in despair.4 The man 
continued to sob and remained limp as the officer tried to lift him to his 
feet.5 The officer warned the man that if he didn’t get up, he would be 
Tasered.6 When the man did not comply, the officer Tasered the man three 
times.7 During each Taser shock, the man convulsed and writhed on the 
ground in pain.8 When the Tasering stopped, the man still could not bring 
himself to his feet.9 After another officer arrived on the scene, the two 
officers easily lifted the suspect off the ground and placed him in a patrol 
car.10  
Another man, suspected of physically abusing his estranged wife, was 
verbally confronted by police.11 Moments into the verbal confrontation, the 
man turned and ran.12 The officers gave chase and attempted to stop the 
man by Tasering him. The suspect resisted the shock and continued to 
flee.13 Eventually the officers caught up to the suspect and Tasered him as 
they tried to bring him under control.14 
The first man was arrested for speeding and sat on the ground crying in 
despair; the other man was suspected of a violent crime and fled police. 
Can you guess which Tasering was ruled reasonable by a federal court? If 
you knew that Tasering the distraught speeder was ruled reasonable15 and 
that Tasering the domestic abuse suspect was not,16 then it should not come 
as a surprise to learn that a federal district court in Arizona ruled that it was 
reasonable to Taser a sleeping man five or six times.17 
Images of officers Tasering suspects can be graphic and difficult to 
watch. Such images can spark outrage and protests—particularly when the 
Tasering seems grossly disproportionate to the culpability of the suspect.18 
                                                                                                                     
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 792–93. 
 8. Id. at 800. 
 9. Id. at 793. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Roberts v. Manigold, 240 F. App’x 675, 675–76 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 12. Id. at 676. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Buckley v. Haddock, 292 F. App’x 791, 792 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 16. Roberts, 240 F. App’x at 678. 
 17. Campos v. City of Glendale, No. CV-060610-PHX-DCG, 2007 WL 4468722, at *1–2, 6 
(D. Ariz. Dec. 14, 2007). 
 18. Jessica DaSilva, Protest Attracts Hundreds, THE INDEPENDENT FLORIDA ALLIGATOR, Sept. 
19, 2007, available at http://www.alligator.org/articles/2007/09/19/news/campus/protest.txt; Martin 
Espinoza, Rally Targets Stun-Gun Deaths, PRESS DEMOCRAT, Dec. 27, 2008, available at 
http://www.pressdemocrat.com/article/20081227/NEWS/812270379/1350?Title=Rally_targets_stu
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And when law enforcement officers don’t face penalties for such 
disproportionate uses of force, the public is left to wonder: how could that 
be possible? By design, the law governing an officer’s use of force is 
nebulous.19 This lack of specificity allows courts to grant law enforcement 
officers a great deal of latitude when deciding how much and what type of 
force to use.20  
Officers can escape liability for excessive force if a court deems the use 
of force reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.21 However, the lack of 
specificity in federal excessive force jurisprudence makes it difficult to 
determine ahead of time what type and how much force a court would 
likely consider reasonable.22 Thus, the jurisprudence provides officers little 
guidance about when to use Tasers against suspects and how to comply 
with the Fourth Amendment.23  
Part II of this Note examines the safety and effectiveness of Taser use 
by highlighting key studies on the topic. Part III of this Note explains 
federal excessive force jurisprudence. Part IV looks at excessive force 
cases to determine how courts have applied the law to specific fact 
patterns. Part IV concludes that courts do not heavily restrict Taser use by 
law enforcement—sometimes even allowing officers to Taser passively 
resisting or vulnerable suspects. Part V surveys state and local laws 
governing Taser use by law enforcement. Finally, Part VI concludes that 
laws governing Taser use by law enforcement can be improved by 
providing officers more guidance about when Taser use is appropriate and 
by crafting laws that provide citizens more protection.24 
II.   SAFETY OF TASER USE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT 
A.  Taser Technology 
Taser devices use compressed nitrogen to fire two needle-like probes 
into a target up to thirty-five feet away.25 The probes deliver up to 50,000 
volts of electricity through two insulated wires that remain connected to the 
                                                                                                                     
n_gun_deaths. 
 19. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 
(1979) (“[T]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise 
definition or mechanical application.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 20. See infra Part IV. 
 21. See, e.g., Graham, 490 U.S. at 395–96; Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1985). 
 22. See infra Part III.B. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See infra Part VI. 
 25. Taser Int’l, Inc., TASER M26, http://www.Taser.com/products/law/Pages/TASERM26.as 
px (last visited Mar. 22, 2010) [hereinafter TASER M26]; Taser Int’l, Inc., TASER X26, 
http://www.Taser.com/products/military/Pages/TASERX26.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2010) 
[hereinafter TASER X26]. 
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Taser device.26 The electric shock causes involuntary muscle contractions 
that incapacitate the targeted person.27  
The electric shock can travel through two inches of clothing, so the 
probes do not need to be embedded into a person’s skin to incapacitate him 
or her. 28 When the probes do penetrate the skin, the probes may become 
embedded as deep as half an inch.29 The electrical shock lasts for about 
five seconds,30 and people typically recover after ten seconds.31 
B.  Taser Safety 
Research shows that the large majority of Taser incidents result in mild 
or no injuries to the suspect.32 In fact, some law enforcement agencies 
report that using Tasers leads to decreases in suspect injuries, officer 
injuries, and firearm usage.33 At the very least, Tasers reduce suspect and 
officer injury rates relative to hand control techniques.34 And the reduction 
                                                                                                                     
 26. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-464, TASER WEAPONS: USE OF TASERS BY 
SELECTED LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 6 (MAY 2005) [hereinafter USGAO REPORT].  The Taser 
has a voltage that is more than 400 times larger than a typical American home power outlet, which 
delivers only 120 volts. See, e.g., ElectricalOutlet.org, Worldwide Electrical Outlet List, 
http://electricaloutlet.org/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2010). 
 27. Taser Int’l, Inc., Neuromuscular Incapacitation (NMI), http://www.Taser.com/research/te 
chnology/Pages/NeuromuscularIncapacitation.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2010). 
 28. TASER M26, supra note 25; TASER X26, supra note 25. 
 29. USGAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 6–7. 
 30. Id. at 6. 
 31. Id. at 7. 
 32. William P. Bozeman et al., Safety and Injury Profile of Conducted Electrical Weapons 
Used by Law Enforcement Officers Against Criminal Suspects, ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 5–6 
(2008). In a study of Taser use by six law enforcement agencies against 1201 criminal suspects, the 
Taser use resulted in mild or no injuries 99.75% of the time. Id. at 5. Of the mild injuries, most 
(83%), were skin punctures from the metal Taser probes. Id. at 6. 
 33. Id. at 6; see also Shaun H. Kedir, Stunning Trends in Shocking Crimes: A Comprehensive 
Analysis of Taser Weapons, 20 J.L. &  HEALTH 357, 379–80 (2007); Taser International Inc., 
Statistics and White Papers, http://www.Taser.com/RESEARCH/STATISTICS/Pages/default.aspx 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2010) (linking to various police agency reports indicating reduced injury rates 
with Taser use). 
 34. Michael R. Smith et al., The Impact of Conducted Energy Devices and Other Types of 
Force and Resistance on Officer and Suspect Injuries, 30 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES &  
MGMT. 423, 435–37 (2007). 
Hand control techniques involve the use of bare hands to guide, hold, or restrain a suspect. 
George Godoy, Police Oral Boards and the Use of Force Continuum, POLICE TEST, 
http://www.policetest.info/FORCE_CONTINUUM_POLICE_USE_OF_FORCE.htm (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2010).  
Hand control techniques may be “soft” or “hard.” Soft hand control techniques include 
applying force to pressure points and using take-down techniques that have a minimal chance of 
injury. Id.; see also Smith, supra, at 429, 434. Hard hand control techniques include kicks, punches, 
or other striking techniques that have a moderate chance of injury. Godoy, supra; see also Smith, 
supra, at 429, 434. 
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in injury rates compares favorably with respect to other force techniques 
such as pepper spray.35  
Tasers, however, are not without their risks. There are significant risks 
of minor injuries from Taser probes that become embedded in a suspect’s 
skin36 and from falls that occur after a suspect is incapacitated.37  
More significant, however, are reports of deaths following Taser usage. 
A study by American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California (ACLU-
NC) reported that between 1999 and 2005 there were 148 deaths in the 
United States and Canada following Taser use by law enforcement.38 
Amnesty International reviewed seventy-four of those cases and found that 
although coroners usually attributed the cause of death to factors such as 
drug intoxication or heart disease, at least in five cases, the coroners found 
that Taser use was a contributing cause of death.39 Amnesty International 
noted that most of the suspects who died after being Tasered exhibited risk 
factors associated with heart failure such as high concentrations of drugs or 
heart disease.40 Some suspects died following a violent struggle with 
police, and some were restrained using techniques that severely restrict 
breathing such as “hogties” or “chokeholds.”41  
Amnesty International’s findings raise concerns that Taser use 
combined with other factors could exacerbate the possibility of 
asphyxiation or cardiac arrest in some suspects.42 Even worse, in more than 
half the cases, the deceased suspects were subjected to multiple Taser 
shocks.43 Amnesty International noted that because the vast majority of 
Taser incidents involve only one shock and no deaths, instances of suspect 
deaths involve a disproportionate number of multiple shock incidents.44 
Although some studies indicate that Tasers can be safely used on 
healthy people,45 there is a dearth of studies that address the risk of 
                                                                                                                     
 35. Bozeman, supra note 32, at 6. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Smith, supra note 34, at 428 (reporting a study by the Seattle Police Department that 
found suspects were injured by falls in 13% of Taser uses). 
 38. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N. CAL., STUN GUN FALLACY : HOW THE LACK OF TASER 
REGULATION ENDANGERS LIVES 3 (2005) [hereinafter ACLU, TASER STUDY].  
 39. AMNESTY INT’L, EXCESSIVE AND LETHAL FORCE?: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL’S CONCERNS 
ABOUT DEATHS AND ILL TREATMENT INVOLVING POLICY USE OF TASERS 42 (2004) [hereinafter 
AMNESTY INT’L]. 
 40. Id. at 43. 
 41. Id. at 43, 56. 
 42. Id. at 53–54, 56–57. 
 43. Id. at 45. Amnesty noted that forty-one of seventy-four deaths involved multiple Taser 
shocks to the suspect. Id. at 45 n.116. The number of incidents involving multiple Taser shocks may 
actually have been higher because in twenty-eight of the cases, there was no information regarding 
how many times the suspect was shocked. Id. 
 44. Id. at 46. 
 45. Jeffrey D. Ho et al., Echocardiographic Evaluation of a TASER-X26 Application in the 
Ideal Human Cardiac Axis, 15 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 838, 843 (2008) (reporting that exposing a 
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Tasering vulnerable individuals,46 and some experts question the safety of 
Tasering vulnerable individuals.47 Thus, although Tasers can be used safely 
in most instances, there are still significant health and safety concerns 
associated with Taser use. For example, Tasering vulnerable suspects such 
as the elderly, those with heart problems, minors, restrained suspects, or 
those who are high on drugs may increase their risk of heart failure or 
asphyxiation. And shocking suspects multiple times may also increase a 
suspect’s risk of serious health problems. All of the foregoing factors 
should be accounted for when crafting laws and policies that govern Taser 
use by law enforcement and when considering excessive force claims 
based on Taser use. 
III.   CHALLENGING TASER USE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT: EXCESSIVE 
FORCE CLAIMS  
Excessive force claims typically arise as federal civil suits under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.48 Section 1983 gives a cause of action to someone who has 
been deprived of his or her constitutional rights by someone acting under 
the color of law.49 The particular constitutional provision enforced depends 
on the context in which the alleged excessive force occurred.50 If the 
alleged excessive force occurred during an arrest or investigatory stop by 
law enforcement, the § 1983 claim is properly analyzed using the 
reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment.51 That is, the facts of 
the case are evaluated to determine whether the officer’s use of force, if 
                                                                                                                     
healthy individual to a ten–second Taser shock did not result in dangerous heart-beat conditions); 
see also ACLU, TASER STUDY, supra note 38, at 4 (noting that independent Taser studies have been 
limited to conducting studies on the effects of Tasers on healthy people); AMNESTY INT’L, supra 
note 39, at 61 (reporting that Taser International contends the electrical output of a Taser is far 
below that necessary to induce severe heart conditions).  
 46. ACLU, TASER STUDY, supra note 38, at 4 (noting that existing Taser studies do not 
address the effects on vulnerable classes of people). 
 47. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 39, at 61–62. 
 48. See Rachel A. Harmon, When is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 
1126 (2008); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 375–76 (2007); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 
386, 390 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 5 (1985). 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 50. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. In Graham, the Supreme Court explicitly held that the 
Fourth Amendment protects against the use of excessive force during an arrest or investigatory stop 
by police. Id. In footnote 10 of its opinion, however, the Court noted “[i]t is clear . . . that the Due 
Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force,” and “[a]fter conviction, 
the Eighth Amendment ‘serves as the primary source of substantive protection.’” Id. at 395 n.10 
(quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)). 
 51. Id. at 395. The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against “unreasonable searches and 
seizures.” U.S. CONST amend. IV. As applied to excessive force claims, “[a] ‘seizure’ triggering the 
Fourth Amendment’s protections occurs only when government actors have, ‘by means of physical 
force or show of authority, . . . in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.’” Graham, 490 U.S. 
at 395 n.10 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)). 
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any, was reasonable under the circumstances.52  
When an individual brings a § 1983 claim against a law enforcement 
officer, the officer may assert qualified immunity as an affirmative 
defense.53 If the court grants the officer qualified immunity, the officer is 
immune from suit, and the plaintiff’s claim is essentially defeated.54 
Because qualified immunity is an immunity from suit, government officials 
have incentive to assert the defense early in litigation—before the suit goes 
to trial.55 Thus, the qualified immunity analysis will often provide a 
starting point for § 1983 claims. In cases where the plaintiff alleges that 
officers used excessive force during an arrest or investigatory stop, the next 
step would be to determine whether the officer’s use of force was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Part II.A discusses the details of 
the qualified immunity analysis, and Part II.B discusses the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness analysis. 
A.  Qualified Immunity Analysis 
The Supreme Court has established a two-part test to determine whether 
a government official is entitled to qualified immunity.56 The first part asks 
“whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts 
alleged.”57 The second part asks “whether the right was clearly 
established.”58 In Pearson v. Callahan, the Court held that the two parts 
need not be addressed in order, and lower courts have the discretion to 
decide which of the two parts to analyze first.59 Pearson overturned the 
controversial “order of battle” rule established in Saucier v. Katz in which 
the Court previously held that the two parts of the qualified immunity 
                                                                                                                     
 52. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be 
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene . . . .”). 
 53. See ERWIN CHEMIRINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, 509–10, 514 (4th ed. 2003); see also 
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 375–76 (2007); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 197, 200–01 (2001). 
 54. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).  Qualified immunity is a judicially-created 
doctrine that protects government officials from suit as long as a reasonable official would not have 
been on notice that the conduct in question was clearly unlawful. See, e.g., Saucier, 533 U.S. at 
202; Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638–39 (1987). By only granting partial immunity, 
rather than absolute immunity, the doctrine recognizes that in some situations “an action for 
damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees.” Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).  
In Harlow, the Supreme Court noted that absolute immunity is reserved for government 
“officials whose special functions or constitutional status requires complete protection from suit.” 
Id. at 807. Among those officials entitled to absolute immunity are legislators, judges, prosecutors, 
and executive officers engaged in judicial functions. Id. 
 55. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200–01; Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. 
 56. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200–01. 
 57. Id. at 200. 
 58. Id. at 201. 
 59. 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009). 
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analysis had to be answered in order.60  
 The policy behind the qualified immunity defense is that in cases where 
a government official is required to make discretionary decisions, the 
public interest is best served if the government official can act without 
fearing the consequences of a lawsuit.61 A lawsuit would subject the 
government official to the distractions of a trial. And the mere threat of a 
lawsuit may inhibit the official’s discretionary actions and deter people 
from entering public service.62 To serve the policy of insulating 
government officials from litigation, the defense of qualified immunity acts 
as “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.”63 If the 
case is permitted to go to trial, the policy behind the defense is defeated, 
and the defense is “effectively lost.”64 To further protect government 
officials from the burdens of trial, a district court’s order denying qualified 
immunity is immediately appealable.65 Thus, it is common for an appeals 
court to decide questions of qualified immunity because the government 
official will almost always appeal a decision denying qualified immunity.66  
If a court were to start by addressing the first prong of the qualified 
immunity analysis, “whether a constitutional right would have been 
violated on the facts alleged,”67 the court would appear to be adjudicating 
the plaintiff’s claim on the merits.68 The Supreme Court, however, has 
made it clear that questions of qualified immunity are distinct from the 
plaintiff’s claim on the merits.69 Qualified immunity is a right to be free 
from the burdens of trial—a right that is distinct from the constitutional 
right asserted in the plaintiff’s claim.70 If a court deciding a question of 
qualified immunity determines that a government official violated the 
plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the consequence is that the official may not 
be entitled to qualified immunity. The final determination on the merits of 
whether the plaintiff’s rights were violated would still be left to the fact 
finder. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 60. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 
 61. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982). 
 62. Id.  
 63. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 526–27. 
 66. For example, each circuit court case mentioned in this Note is an appeal of a summary 
judgment motion on the issue of qualified immunity. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 
F.3d 491, 496–97 (8th Cir. 2009); Buckley v. Haddock, 292 F. App’x 791, 792–93 (11th Cir. 
2008); Moretta v. Abbott, 280 F. App’x 823, 824 (11th Cir. 2008); Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 
509 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th Cir. 2007); Roberts v. Manigold, 240 F. App’x 675, 675 (6th Cir. 
2007); Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 67. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). 
 68. Id. at 203. 
 69. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527–28. 
 70. Id. 
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Furthermore, the qualified immunity defense is typically asserted in a 
motion for summary judgment,71 and a court reviewing the motion must 
view the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.72 Thus, a court’s 
ruling on the constitutional violation as part of the qualified immunity 
analysis is not based on the final determination of facts by the fact finder. 
Again, the final ruling on the merits of plaintiff’s claim would be left to the 
fact finder.73  
With regard to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, 
“whether the right was clearly established,”74 the focus is not on whether 
prior case law has held the exact conduct in question to be 
unconstitutional.75 Rather, the focus is on whether prior case law would put 
a reasonable official on notice that the conduct violated a constitutional 
right.76 Thus, in the context of a § 1983 excessive force claim, even if a 
court determines that law enforcement officers violated the plaintiff’s 
Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force, the officers are 
nonetheless immune from suit if the officers made a reasonable mistake as 
to what the law requires.77 
In many situations, courts prefer to start with the second prong of the 
qualified immunity analysis.78 In fact, the Saucier “order of battle” rule 
was highly criticized.79 By forcing courts to first consider whether an 
officer’s conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, courts must 
either create a new constitutional right under the facts alleged or determine 
that no such right exists.80 This violates the “long-honored principle that a 
court should decide a constitutional question only when there is no other 
basis for resolving the dispute.”81 Further, unnecessarily deciding a 
constitutional question may be considered a waste of judicial resources.82 
                                                                                                                     
 71. Id. at 526. 
 72. Id. at 528. 
 73. For example, in Michaels v. City of Vermillion, the district court resolved a question of 
qualified immunity in favor of the plaintiff where there were substantial discrepancies between the 
plaintiff’s and the officer’s version of the facts. 539 F. Supp. 2d 975, 979 (N.D. Ohio 2008). The 
plaintiff alleged that the officer Tasered him approximately twenty-five times while the plaintiff was 
handcuffed and passively sitting in the back of a police car. Id. The officer, on the other hand, 
maintained that the plaintiff was only Tasered a few times, and that the plaintiff was actively 
resisting arrest. Id.  
 74. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 
 75. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205–06; 
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).  
 76. Hope, 536 U.S. at 739; Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205–06; Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. 
 77. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. 
 78. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 817–18 (2009); Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under 
the Constitution: Dicta about Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1275–81 (2006). 
 79. See supra note 78. 
 80. Leval, supra note 78, at 1276. 
 81. Leval, supra note 78, at 1277. 
 82. Leval, supra note 78, at 1277–78; see also Michael J. Hooi, Qualified Immunity: When is 
9
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The constitutional question could be avoided and judicial resources 
conserved if courts were allowed to move directly to the second question 
of whether the plaintiff’s rights were clearly established.83 
On the other hand, there are also strong arguments in favor of 
answering the qualified immunity questions sequentially. Requiring courts 
to first consider whether an officer’s conduct violated the Constitution 
helps to ensure that repeated unconstitutional conduct will not escape 
judicial review simply because there is no prior case law that clearly 
establishes the conduct as unconstitutional.84 Also, judicial efficiency 
might actually be improved when courts carefully consider the facts of 
each case and rule on whether a constitutional right was violated.85 A more 
developed body of case law gives officers a better idea on how to comport 
their actions with the Constitution.86 And potential plaintiffs are better 
equipped to assess the chances of success in court and are less likely to file 
suit if the chances of success are low.87 Finally, perhaps the strongest 
argument in favor of the sequential analysis is that it helps ensure a § 1983 
plaintiff has his day in court. Courts must consider the facts of each case 
and rule on whether the plaintiff’s rights were violated.88 The analysis for 
determining whether the plaintiff’s rights were violated is the subject of the 
next section.  
B.  Fourth Amendment Analysis of Excessive Force Claims 
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable searches 
and seizures by government officials.89 Generally, a “seizure” triggering 
Fourth Amendment protection occurs when law enforcement officers use 
even minimal force.90 Thus, in a § 1983 action alleging excessive force, the 
issue is whether an officer’s use of force was “reasonable” under the 
                                                                                                                     
a Loss Ultimately a Win?, 60 FLA. L. REV. 979, 987 (2008). 
 83. Leval, supra note 78, at 1281. The lone inquiry of whether the right was clearly 
established was actually the original formulation of the test. S e Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 
528 (1985) (“All [an appellate court] need determine is a question of law: whether the legal norms 
allegedly violated by the defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions.”). 
The first prong of the test, whether the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right, was not 
added by the Supreme Court until 1991 in Siegert v. Gilley. 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991). 
 84. Leval, supra note 78, at 1280. 
 85. Hooi, supra note 82, at 987–88. 
 86. Hooi, supra note 82, at 987. 
 87. Hooi, supra note 82, at 987–88. 
 88. Hooi, supra note 82, at 988. 
 89. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 90. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 19 n.16 (1968) (“A ‘seizure’ triggering the Fourth Amendment’s protections occurs only when 
government actors have, ‘by means of physical force or show of authority, . . . in some way 
restrained the liberty of a citizen’”)); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (citing United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (“Whenever an officer restrains the freedom of 
a person to walk away, he has seized that person.”)). 
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Fourth Amendment.91 The foundation of the Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness determination is a balancing test that weighs “‘the nature 
and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment 
interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.”92  
The Supreme Court first applied the balancing test to a § 1983 
excessive force claim in Tennessee v. Garner.93 In Garner, police shot and 
killed a fifteen-year-old, unarmed burglary suspect as he fled the scene.94 
When applying the Fourth Amendment balancing test, the Court first 
identified the interests at stake for both the plaintiff and the government.95 
The Court noted that a suspect has a “fundamental interest in his own life,” 
and “[t]he intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is 
unmatched.”96 The Court balanced this interest against the government’s 
interest in “effective law enforcement.”97 On balance, the Court concluded 
that using deadly force to prevent the escape of a non-dangerous suspect 
was constitutionally unreasonable.98  
In coming to its conclusion the Court carefully considered the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the shooting. In particular, the Garner Court 
placed heavy emphasis on the non-dangerous nature of the suspect.99 Th  
Court hypothesized that if the suspect had threatened the officers with a 
weapon or committed a crime with the potential to inflict serious physical 
harm, the use of deadly force to prevent escape might have been 
justified.100 When determining whether the suspect posed a threat, the 
Court considered factors such as the suspect’s age and physical 
characteristics;101 the severity of the underlying crime;102 and whether the 
suspect was armed.103  
Although Garner analyzed the suspect’s § 1983 excessive force claim 
under the Fourth Amendment, the Court did not provide specific guidance 
about when the Fourth Amendment standard applies to excessive force 
claims.104 As a result, after Garner, lower courts continued to apply a 
                                                                                                                     
 91. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be 
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene . . . .”). 
 92. Id. (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 8). 
 93. Garner, 471 U.S. at 7–8. 
 94. Id. at 3–4, 4 n.2. 
 95. Id. at 9. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 11. 
 99. Id. at 10–11, 20–21. 
 100. Id. at 11. 
 101. Id. at 21 (“Officer Hymon could not reasonably have believed that Garner–young, slight, 
and unarmed–posed any threat.”). 
 102. Id. (“While we agree that burglary is a serious crime, we cannot agree that it is so 
dangerous as automatically to justify the use of deadly force.”). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). In Graham, the Court specifically 
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generic substantive due process test “indiscriminately to all excessive force 
claims lodged against law enforcement.”105 This prompted the Supreme 
Court in Graham v. Connor, to make “explicit what was implicit in 
Garner’s analysis . . . that all claims that law enforcement officers have 
used excessive force . . . in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or 
other ‘seizure’ . . . should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.”106 
The Graham Court reaffirmed the balancing test used in Garner and 
expounded on the fact-sensitive nature of its application.107 The Court held 
that proper application of the balancing test “requires careful attention to 
the facts and circumstances of each particular case,” and that “[t]he 
‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the 
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene . . . .”108 In the Court’s 
view, a factual analysis is necessary because it is impossible to precisely 
define a reasonableness standard that can be mechanically applied in every 
case.109  
Lower courts have widely embraced the Graham approach when 
deciding § 1983 excessive force claims,110 employing the Supreme Court’s 
balancing test and list of relevant circumstances.111 And courts have 
adopted the officer’s point of view when evaluating the reasonableness of 
an officer’s actions.112 The Supreme Court’s § 1983 excessive force 
jurisprudence, however, is not without its critics. As Professor Rachel 
Harmon points out, the balancing test does not provide law enforcement 
officers with clear guidance on how to comport their conduct with the 
Constitution.113 The test leaves basic questions unanswered: when may an 
officer use force, and what type and how much force is appropriate?114 
Ideally, a test for evaluating the reasonableness of a particular use of 
force would provide officers guidance without having to wait for courts to 
                                                                                                                     
noted that it was making explicit what had only been implicit in Garner. Id. 
 105. Id. at 393. 
 106. Id. at 395. 
 107. Id. at 396. 
 108. Id. When discussing the appropriate perspective for evaluating the reasonableness of an 
officer’s use of force, the Court also noted that the test must account for the fact that “officers are 
often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and 
rapidly evolving.” Id. at 396–97. 
 109. Id. at 396.  
 110. See, e.g., Buckley v. Haddock, 292 F. App’x 791, 793–94 (11th Cir. 2008); Roberts v. 
Manigold, 240 F. App’x 675, 677 (6th Cir. 2007); Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 
1281 (10th Cir. 2007); Brooks v. City of Seattle, No. C06-1681RAJ, 2008 WL 2433717, at *3 
(W.D. Wash. June 12, 2008); Michaels v. City of Vermillion, 539 F. Supp. 2d 975, 985–86 (N.D. 
Ohio 2008); see also Harmon, supra note 48, at 1129–30. 
 111. See supra note 110. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Harmon, supra note 48, at 1127, 1130. 
 114. Id. 
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decide whether a course of action is constitutional.115 It is unlikely that 
officers faced with “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving”116 situations 
can quickly and accurately perform the prescribed balancing test calculus 
before making a decision on how much and what type of force to use. 
Furthermore, the balancing test contains two inherent sources of 
uncertainty that make it difficult for officers to evaluate the reasonableness 
of a particular use of force before they are faced with such tense situations.  
The first source of uncertainty stems from the fact-sensitive nature of 
the test: Reasonable individuals may interpret the same set of facts 
differently, leading to different conclusions about whether a particular use 
of force was reasonable. For example, in Scott v. Harris,117 the Supreme 
Court held that it was reasonable for an officer to run a speeding suspect 
off the road118 where the suspect led officers on “a Hollywood-style car 
chase of the most frightening sort.”119 When viewing the same video 
evidence as the majority, however, the dissent had a completely different 
view of the facts.120 The dissent noted that the video did not clearly 
establish the suspect had run any red lights.121 And the dissent suggested 
that the civilian cars in the video could have safely pulled to the side of the 
road in response to the oncoming police sirens rather than having been 
forced to the side of the road as the majority concluded.122  
The second source of uncertainty arises because the Supreme Court 
does not limit or weight the facts and circumstances that a court may 
consider in the balancing test analysis.123 This leaves courts and law 
enforcement officers with little guidance about how to determine the 
relevance of a particular fact or circumstance.124 Because the balancing test 
itself does not provide officers much guidance, they must rely on a 
rigorous, fact-based analysis of existing case law to determine the 
constitutionality of a course of action. This approach, however, is 
problematic for officers faced with a novel set of circumstances not 
previously addressed by the courts. Furthermore, officers may not be able 
to rely on the courts if decisions are split on the constitutionality of a 
course of action.  
At least one certainty is that § 1983 excessive force claims arising out 
of an arrest or investigatory stop are properly analyzed under the Fourth 
                                                                                                                     
 115. Id. at 1142–43. 
 116. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). 
 117.  550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
 118. Id. at 375–76. 
 119. Id. at 380. 
 120. Id. at 390–92 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 121. Id. at 391–92. 
 122. Id. at 390–91. 
 123. See Harmon, supra note 48, at 1130. 
 124. Id. 
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Amendment.125 The analysis balances the plaintiff’s interest in being free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures against the government interests 
at stake.126 The analysis requires courts to consider all the relevant facts 
and circumstances of the case.127 And the analysis is evaluated from the 
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.128 Although the balancing 
test has been widely adopted by lower courts,129 it does not provide officers 
with specific guidance on when or what type of force is reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment.130  
The next Part looks at a number of § 1983 excessive force cases where 
officers Tasered a suspect during an arrest or investigatory stop. By closely 
examining the facts and circumstances of each case, Part III develops a set 
of general rules about when a court is likely to find an officer’s Taser use 
reasonable. A clear understanding of the laws governing Taser use by law 
enforcement will provide a basis for critiquing and suggesting 
improvements to those laws.  
IV.   POLICE USE OF TASERS DURING ARREST OR INVESTIGATORY STOP 
A.  Tasering an Actively Resisting Suspect 
In Neal-Lomax v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department,131 the 
district court ruled that it was reasonable for a police officer to Taser 
William Lomax seven times because Lomax resisted the officer’s attempts 
to place him in an ambulance.132 The incident resulted in Lomax’s death.133  
The incident arose when security guards found Lomax high on PCP and 
pacing in circles around an apartment complex parking lot.134 The guards 
reported that Lomax appeared dazed and confused, and that he was 
unresponsive to questions.  One of the security guards asked Lomax if he 
wanted medical attention, and Lomax responded that he did; the guards 
called for medical assistance.135  
While the security guards were waiting for medical assistance, Officer 
Rader of the Las Vegas Police Department arrived on the scene.136 Officer 
Rader recognized Lomax from a previous encounter where Lomax was 
                                                                                                                     
 125. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). 
 126. Id. at 396. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. at 396–97. 
 129. See Harmon, supra note 48, at 1130. 
 130. Id. at 1127. 
 131.  574 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Nev. 2008). 
 132. Id. at 1178–81, 1186.  
 133. Id. at 1181. 
 134. Id. at 1178. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. 
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high on PCP and combative.137 One of the security guards took Lomax’s 
pulse and found that his heart was racing.138 The security guards attempted 
to place Lomax in handcuffs, but Lomax resisted.139 Officer Rader warned 
Lomax that if he did not comply, he would be Tasered.140 Lomax 
continued to resist, and Officer Rader applied the Taser directly to 
Lomax’s neck in a drive-stun mode, a method in which the Taser is 
aggressively driven into the target area.141 Officer Rader applied the Taser 
a second time before the security guards were able to handcuff Lomax.142  
When medical personnel arrived, they found Lomax pinned to the 
ground with a knee on his back.143 The medical personnel asked the 
security guard to remove his knee so that Lomax could breathe more 
freely.144 Officer Rader and the security guards tried to strap Lomax to a 
gurney to load him into an ambulance, but Lomax continued to struggle.145 
Officer Rader Tasered Lomax five more times before he and the security 
guards were able to strap Lomax to the gurney and load him into the 
ambulance.146 After each Taser use, Lomax became compliant, but he 
would begin struggling again seconds afterwards. 
In the ambulance, Lomax stopped breathing, and he later died at the 
hospital.147 The county coroner concluded that the cause of death was 
cardiac arrest, and that the Taser was a contributing factor.148 According to 
the coroner, the combination of PCP, being restrained, and Taser shocks 
restricted Lomax’s breathing until “he finally was depleted and went into 
cardiac arrest.”149  
Officer Rader completed a training course on Taser use before he was 
allowed to carry a Taser.150 The course discouraged Tasering vulnerable or 
high-risk individuals such as pregnant women, the elderly, or people in 
handcuffs.151 The training program taught that Tasers become a pain 
compliance tool when used to subdue someone high on PCP, and that pain 
compliance has a limited effectiveness in that situation.152 When an 
                                                                                                                     
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1179. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 1180. 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. at 1180–81. 
 150. Id. at 1176. 
 151. Id. at 1176–77. 
 152. Id. at 1177. The training program stated, “Persons whom are highly focused, under the 
influence of drugs/alcohol or mentally disturbed are prone to what is called ‘mind-body 
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individual is resistant to pain compliance, the program suggested that the 
Taser can be most effective when used in a drive-stun mode.153 
After considering all of the facts and circumstances, the court held that 
Officer Rader’s Taser use was reasonable.154 The court noted that Lomax 
was vigorously resisting, and the Taser was effective in getting Lomax to 
comply—if only for a short time.155 Also, Officer Rader used the Taser in a 
manner consistent with his training,156 and he repeatedly warned Lomax 
that if he didn’t comply, he would be Tasered.157 Finally, the court 
concluded that the Taser allowed Lomax access to medical attention, and it 
helped ensure the safety of the people Lomax was struggling against.158 
Thus, Officer Rader’s actions were reasonable because he used trained law 
enforcement techniques, and he ultimately helped ensure the safety of all 
parties involved.  
The district court’s reasoning is debatable in several respects. Officer 
Rader’s Taser use did not best serve the government’s interest in effective 
law enforcement.159 Although Officer Rader warned Lomax several times 
before Tasering him, Lomax was unresponsive and under the influence of 
powerful drugs.160 Thus, the warnings may have been useless in mitigating 
the risks of the situation. Further, even though Officer Rader was 
eventually able to restrain Lomax, it took seven Taser shocks–illustrating  
that the Taser was not entirely effective or by any means efficient law 
enforcement. 
The district court also suggested that the Taser helped secure the safety 
of all parties involved.161 Lomax’s death, however, casts serious doubt on 
the conclusion that the Taser helped secure Lomax’s safety. Officer Rader 
knew that Lomax had a history of drug use and that he was probably high 
at the time.162 Officer Rader also knew that Lomax had a high heart rate 
and required medical attention.163 Further, Officer Rader had been trained 
to avoid using a Taser on high-risk individuals.164 Given these 
                                                                                                                     
disconnection.’ If this is the case, then the [Taser] becomes a pain compliance tool and has limited 
threat reduction potential.” Id. The program further taught that for people high on PCP “pain 
compliance DOES NOT WORK!” Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 1186. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 1185. 
 158. Id. at 1186. 
 159. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
balancing test weighs the suspect’s interests against the government’s interest in effective law 
enforcement). 
 160. Neal-Lomax v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1178–80 (2008). 
 161. Id. at 1185–86. 
 162. Id. at 1178, 1185. 
 163. Id. at 1178.  
 164. Id. at 1177. 
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circumstances, it is doubtful that a reasonable officer could have concluded 
that Tasering Lomax seven times was in Lomax’s best interest.  
Finally, the court may have overemphasized the threat that Lomax 
posed to those around him. There is little doubt that Lomax put those 
assisting him at risk by struggling so violently.165 However, he was not 
actively engaging the parties involved. Instead, Lomax was dazed, 
confused, and simply reacting to the situation around him.166 
After stripping away some of the district court’s weaker arguments, we 
are left only with the fact that Lomax was actively resisting an officer’s 
attempts to restrain him. Thus, it seems active resistance alone might 
entitle an officer to qualified immunity—even where the officer Tasered a 
handcuffed, vulnerable individual who later died.  
Indeed, in the qualified immunity analysis, active resistance by the 
arrestee weighs heavily in the officer’s favor. Although Lomax presents an 
extreme example, other courts have also ruled that active resistance entitles 
an officer to qualified immunity where the officer Tasered a vulnerable 
individual or an individual who was in custody at the time.167 
In Edwards v. City of Martins Ferry,168 a district court ruled that it was 
reasonable for an officer to Taser an eighty-two year old man with 
Alzheimer’s disease because the man continued to struggle after the officer 
pinned him face down on the hood of a police car.169  
The incident arose when Edwards was on his daily walk and an officer 
confronted him in response to reports that Edwards had relieved himself 
behind a bush in a nearby park.170 When Edwards ignored the officer’s 
command to stop, the officer grabbed Edwards by the arm.171 Edwards 
jerked his arm away and raised his hands in a defensive posture.172 The 
officer grabbed Edwards and slammed him on the hood of the police car.173 
The officer advised Mr. Edwards that he was under arrest, and when Mr. 
Edwards continued to struggle, the officer Tasered him.174 After being 
Tasered, Mr. Edwards became compliant, and the officer was easily able to 
                                                                                                                     
 165. Id. at 1185–86. 
 166. Id. at 1178. 
 167. See, e.g., Edwards v. City of Martins Ferry, 554 F. Supp. 2d 797, 807–08 (S.D. Ohio 
2008); Johnson v. City of Lincoln Park, 434 F. Supp. 2d 467, 479–80 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
 168.  554 F. Supp. 2d 797 (S.D. Ohio 2008). 
 169. Id. at 800, 808. 
 170. Id. at 800. 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id.  
 173. Id.  
 174. Id. at 801. The facts stated that Mr. Edwards put his arms in the air like a “football 
goalpost.” Id. at 800. The officer claimed that he believed this gesture meant that Edwards was 
assuming a boxing stance and squaring off with him. Id. at 800 n.2. The court sided with the officer 
and held that the officer could reasonably believe that Edwards posed a threat and was squaring off 
with the officer. Id. at 806–07. 
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handcuff him.175 Mr. Edwards did not suffer any injuries as a result of the 
incident.176 
The district court held that the officer’s use of force was reasonable 
because the officer could not simply ignore complaints that Edwards had 
urinated in a public park and allow Edwards to walk away because of his 
advanced age and deteriorated mental state.177 The court found no support 
for the proposition that a more lenient standard should apply to suspects 
who suffer from a mental impairment.178 Further, the court reasoned, 
Edwards was uncooperative, and he resisted arrest.179  
In Johnson v. City of Lincoln Park,180 police Tasered a fourteen-year-
old ninth grader who was handcuffed and surrounded by four police 
officers yet still violently resisting arrest.181 Prior to being Tasered, the 
student, Hollis Smith, was violently resisting arrest by punching, kicking, 
and biting police.182 After being Tasered, however, Smith became 
compliant.183 Smith suffered only minor injuries as a result of the 
Tasering.184 The district court held that the officer’s Taser use was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.185 
Although violent active resistance may justify Tasering a restrained 
suspect, nonviolent active resistance may not.186 In Roberts v. Manigold, 
police responded to reports that Nelson Roberts had physically abused his 
estranged wife.187 At the request of police, Roberts voluntarily returned to 
his wife’s house to file a statement.188 Upon arriving at the house, Roberts 
was met by three officers.189 Roberts felt threatened by the officers, so he 
turned and ran.190 One of the officers, who was a former running back at 
the University of Michigan, ran down Roberts and easily pinned him.191 A 
second officer caught up to the pair and repeatedly Tasered Roberts while 
                                                                                                                     
 175. Id. at 801. 
 176. Id. at 806.  
 177. Id.  
 178. Id. at 807. 
 179. Id. at 805. 
 180.  434 F. Supp. 2d 467 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
 181. Id. at 469–71. 
 182. Id. at 470. 
 183. Id. at 471. 
 184. Id. Smith testified that he had not been hurt by the Taser, and that it “tickled.” Id. at 471 
n.8.  
 185. Id. at 480. 
 186. Roberts v. Manigold, 240 F. App’x 675, 677–78 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Michaels v. 
City of Vermillion, 539 F. Supp. 2d 975, 985–86 (2008). 
 187. 240 F. App’x at 675–76. 
 188. Id. at 676.  
 189. Id.  
 190. Id. 
 191. Id.  
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he was pinned on the ground.192 The Sixth Circuit held that it was 
unreasonable to repeatedly Taser a suspect who was already restrained.193  
In Lomax, Edwards, and Johnson, the plaintiffs were restrained at the 
time they were Tasered—either by handcuffs or by being held face down 
on the hood of a police car. And in each case, the plaintiffs were from a 
vulnerable class of persons—an individual high on PCP who required 
medical attention, an elderly man suffering from Alzheimer’s disease, and 
a minor. It is questionable whether any of the plaintiffs posed a threat to 
police or others.194 Thus, active resistance outweighed other factors such as 
suspect vulnerability and whether the suspect was already in police 
custody. This indicates that active resistance weighs heavily in the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness analysis. 
In both Edwards and Johnson, the plaintiffs became cooperative after 
being Tasered only once. Thus, Tasering the suspect served the 
government’s interest in effective law enforcement.195 And while the 
district courts in Edwards and Johnson may have factored this into the 
reasonableness calculus, Lomax shows that that active resistance might 
justify Tasering a suspect even if it does not serve the government’s 
interest in effective law enforcement.196 
Although courts may consider the degree of active resistance, vigorous 
active resistance is not necessary to justify an officer’s Taser use as 
reasonable.197 For example, in Campos v. City of Glendale,198 the district 
court ruled that it was reasonable for police to Taser an unconscious man, 
who was lying face down on a bed, because the man pulled his arms away 
as the officers tried to handcuff him.199  
 
                                                                                                                     
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 678. 
 194. Edwards was accused of only a minor crime, and Lomax was not accused of any crime at 
all. Edwards was elderly and had a debilitating mental condition, and Lomax was dazed, confused, 
and required medical assistance. Thus, both Edwards and Lomax were not accused of any 
dangerous underlying crime, and both had significant mental or physical impairments. Finally, both 
Lomax and Edwards had already been restrained by police at the time they were Tasered. Thus, it is 
unlikely that either Edwards or Lomax posed a threat to officers. Although Smith was violently 
resisting police, he was also handcuffed and surrounded by four police officers when he was 
Tasered. 
 195. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985). 
 196. Neal-Lomax v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1185–86 (D. Nev. 
2008). 
 197. See generally Edwards v. City of Martins Ferry, 554 F. Supp. 2d 797 (S.D. Ohio 2008) 
(holding that Tasering an eighty-two-year-old man was not excessive under the Fourth 
Amendment); Campos v. City of Glendale, No. CV-06-610-PHX-DGC, 2007 WL 4468722 (D. 
Ariz. Dec. 14, 2007) (holding that Tasering an unconscious man was not excessive under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 198.  No. CV-06-610-PHX-DGC, 2007 WL 4468722 (D. Ariz. Dec. 14, 2007). 
 199. Id. at *4. 
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The incident arose when officers were responding to reports of gunfire 
and  entered the suspect’s home and found him sleeping in a back 
bedroom.200 When the suspect, Jose Campos, did not respond to verbal 
commands, the officers pulled the covers down, rolled Campos over, and 
tried to handcuff him.201 Officers were able to handcuff Campos’s right 
arm, but Campos pulled away, and the officers were unable to handcuff his 
left arm.202 At no point did Campos open his eyes or respond to officers’ 
verbal commands.203 The officers Tasered Campos five or six times before 
they were able to handcuff him.204 
The district court held that Tasering Campos was reasonable because 
Campos was resisting officers, and he may have posed a threat to the 
officers’ safety.205 The court noted that the officers were responding to 
reports of gunfire, and they had not yet found a gun. Thus, a reasonable 
officer may have believed that Campos posed a threat.206  
Once again, it is questionable whether the court correctly concluded 
that Campos posed a threat. By the time the officers Tasered Campos, he 
was in plain sight, and the officers had him surrounded.207 Also, Campos 
had not opened his eyes or responded to officers, and he was merely 
pulling away from officers rather than violently resisting or engaging the 
officers.208 Despite these facts, the district court ruled that it was 
reasonable to Taser a suspect who was actively resisting arrest without 
aggression or violence.209 Thus, a low degree of active resistance such as 
pulling away from officers may justify Tasering a suspect.210 
B.  Tasering a Passively Resisting Suspect 
Although active resistance may overcome a number of other factors 
when determining whether it was reasonable to Taser a suspect, the line is 
                                                                                                                     
 200. Id. at *1. 
 201. Id. at *2. 
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. Campos later told the officers that he did not respond to the officers’ commands 
because he was sleeping and had been drinking that night. He also testified that he was unaware of 
the officers’ presence until after he had been Tasered and was lying face down on the floor of his 
room. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at *3–4. 
 206. Id. at *3.  
 207. Id. at *2. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at *3. 
 210. Edwards also supports this proposition. Edwards v. City of Martins Ferry, 554 F. Supp. 
2d 797, 805–06 (S.D. Ohio 2008). Edwards, like Campos, was merely trying to pull away from the 
officer when he was Tasered. I at 800. And considering that Edwards was elderly and being held 
face down on a police cruiser, Id. at 800–01, Edwards probably could not have overpowered the 
officer or put up a particularly violent fight. But see Roberts v. Manigold, 240 F. App’x 675, 678 
(6th Cir. 2007) (holding that non-violent active resistance did not justify Tasering a suspect who 
was already restrained). 
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not as clear when an individual passively resists officers. Like active 
resistance, passive resistance alone may justify police Tasering a suspect 
during an arrest or investigatory stop.211 But unlike active resistance, 
passive resistance may not overcome other factors such as whether the 
plaintiff is in a vulnerable class of persons,212 whether the plaintiff is 
already restrained by police,213 or whether the use of force was 
disproportionate to the underlying crime.214 
In Buckley v. Haddock,215 the Eleventh Circuit held that it was 
reasonable to Taser a handcuffed arrestee three times as the arrestee sat 
motionless on the side of the road during a routine traffic stop.216 Deputy 
Rackard pulled the suspect over for speeding.217 The stop occurred at night 
along a two-lane highway218 that Deputy Rackard described as 
“desolate.”219 The suspect, Jesse Buckley, was homeless and destitute. 
Buckley was distraught about receiving the ticket, and he refused to sign 
it.220  
Deputy Rackard decided to arrest Buckley, and Buckley did not resist 
when the Deputy Rackard placed him in handcuffs.221 As Deputy Rackard 
walked Buckley to the police cruiser, Buckley dropped to the ground and 
began sobbing.222 Deputy Rackard warned Buckley several times that he 
would be Tasered if he didn’t get up.223 Buckley remained on the ground, 
and he sat limp, motionless, and sobbing.224 Then Deputy Rackard Tasered 
Buckley three times. 225 After each Taser use, Deputy Rackard warned 
Buckley that if he didn’t stand up, he would be Tasered again. While being 
Tasered, Buckley writhed on the ground in pain but did not get up.226 
 
                                                                                                                     
 211. Buckley v. Haddock, 292 F. App’x 791, 794–95 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 212. See, e.g., Brooks v. City of Seattle, No. C06-1681RAJ, 2008 WL 2433717 (W.D. Wash. 
June 12, 2008) (holding that the use of a Taser on a nonviolent pregnant woman constituted the use 
of excessive force). 
 213. Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 496–97 (8th Cir. 2009); Roberts, 240 F. 
App’x 675, 676 (6th Cir. 2007); Brooks, 2008 WL 2433717, at *5; Michaels v. City of Vermillion, 
539 F. Supp. 2d 975, 985 (N.D. Ohio 2008).  
 214. Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1281–82 (10th Cir. 2007); Brooks, 2008 
WL 2433717, at *5; Brown, 574 F.3d at 496–97. 
 215.  292 F. App’x 791 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 216. Id. at 794. 
 217. Id. at 792. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 799 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 220. Id. at 792 (majority opinion). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id.  
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 792–93. 
 226. Id. at 800 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
21
Fabian: Don’t Tase Me Bro!: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Laws Governin
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
784 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
At all times, Buckley and Deputy Rackard maintained a safe distance 
from the highway.227 Between Taser uses, Deputy Rackard would turn his 
back on Buckley and return to his police cruiser to report his status over 
the radio.228 Each time, Buckley was left unattended for a significant 
period, yet Buckley remained motionless. Eventually another officer 
arrived, and the two officers easily lifted Buckley and placed him in a 
patrol car.229 
The court ruled that Deputy Rackard’s Taser use was reasonable 
because by remaining on the side of the highway, Buckley posed a risk to 
himself, Deputy Rackard, and passing motorists.230 Also, the court 
reasoned that that the government’s interest in effective law enforcement 
was served by using a Taser rather than wasting precious police resources 
calling for backup.231 The court noted that Buckley’s injuries were not 
substantial,232 and that a Taser is a moderate, non-lethal force.233  
Here, as in Lomax, the court’s reasoning is questionable on some 
points. It is questionable whether Buckley posed a threat to any of the 
parties involved. Deputy Rackard described the road as “desolate” and “out 
in the middle of no where.”234 And neither Deputy Rackard nor Buckley 
moved closer to the road during the incident.235 Also, Buckley was 
handcuffed at the time, passively resisting, and not the least bit aggressive 
towards Deputy Rackard.236 Buckley did not even attempt to flee when 
Deputy Rackard turned his back and left Buckley alone on the side of the 
road.237 
Deputy Rackard’s Taser use did not serve the government’s interest in 
effective law enforcement.238 The Taser did not even allow Deputy 
Rackard to get Buckley into the police cruiser.239 Tasering Buckley may 
have amounted to pain compliance, and Tasers are ineffective pain 
compliance tools.240 A Taser shock incapacitates the target, and the target 
is temporarily unable to comply with an officer’s demands.241 Thus, 
successive Taser shocks may actually frustrate an officer’s attempt to 
secure suspect compliance. 
                                                                                                                     
 227. Id. at 802. 
 228. Id. at 800–01. 
 229. Id. at 793 (majority opinion); Id. at 801 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 230. Id. at 794–95 (majority opinion). 
 231. Id. at 795–96. 
 232. Id. at 796. 
 233. Id.  
 234. Id. at 799. 
 235. Id. at 802 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 804. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 803. 
 241. Id.  
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Deputy Rackard’s safer, non-violent alternative was to call for 
backup.242 And calling for backup would not have been a waste of police 
resources because it was already police policy to call for backup any time a 
Taser was deployed.243 Thus, the same amount of officers and resources 
were required whether or not a Taser was used.  
If Tasering Buckley did not serve the government’s interest in effective 
law enforcement, and if it did not prevent imminent harm to the parties 
involved, then we are left to conclude that passive non-compliance was 
enough to justify Tasering Buckley.244 It is important to keep in mind that 
passive resistance appears to be the minimum that would justify Tasering a 
suspect. Other factors may swing the Fourth Amendment balancing test in 
plaintiff’s favor.  
For example, in Casey v. City of Federal Heights,245 the Tenth Circuit 
found that Tasering a passively resisting suspect was unreasonable because 
the officer’s use of force was disproportionate to the underlying crime and 
because the officer Tasered the suspect without warning.246  
In Casey, the suspect, Edward Casey, walked out of a courthouse 
holding his own court records despite being told by a clerk not to take the 
court records.247 Casey went to his truck to get his wallet so that he could 
pay the cashier.248 While walking back to the courthouse, however, Casey 
was stopped by a police officer.249 The officer demanded that Casey hand 
him the court records.250 Casey held out his open briefcase with the records 
visible, but the officer refused to take them, so Casey walked past the 
officer toward the courthouse.251 Then, without warning or explanation, the 
officer tackled Casey;252 Casey did not fight back.253  
At that point, a second officer arrived on the scene and immediately 
Tasered Casey multiple times—again, without warning or explanation.254 
The Court ruled that Tasering Casey was unreasonable because it was 
                                                                                                                     
 242. Id. at 805. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See also Campos v. City of Glendale, No. CV-06-610-PHX-DGC, 2007 WL 4468722, at 
*1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 14, 2007). 
 245.  509 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 246. Id. at 1285–86. 
 247. Id. at 1279–80. 
 248. Id. Removing the records may have amounted to a misdemeanor under state law, but 
Casey eventually pleaded guilty to a lesser charge of “obstructing government operations.” Id. at 
1281.  
 249. Id. at 1280. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 1285. 
 254. Id. at 1280, 1285. 
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disproportionate to the underlying crime and because the officers did not 
give Casey clear warning that he was under arrest or that he was going to 
be Tasered.255 
Similarly, in Brown v. City of Golden Valley,256 the Eighth Circuit ruled 
that it was unreasonable for officers to Taser a passenger who refused to 
exit the car after officers stopped the car for speeding.257  The plaintiff, 
Sandra Brown, became terrified after officers arrested the driver, her 
husband.258 According to Brown, the officers were acting aggressive, and 
they never told her why her husband was arrested.259 In her frightened 
state, Brown called 911.260 One of the officers yanked open the passenger 
side door and shouted at Brown to take off her seat belt and hang up the 
phone.261 Brown replied that she was scared and wanted to stay on the line 
with the 911 operator. Then, without warning, the officer Tasered 
Brown.262 
The court ruled that the officer used excessive force by Tasering 
Brown.263 The court reasoned that Tasering Brown was disproportionate to 
the underlying crime—a minor traffic violation.264 Further, the court noted 
that Brown was already surrounded by four officers; that she was not 
attempting to flee; and that she posed at most a minimal safety threat.265  
Brown was passively resisting the officer by disobeying the officer’s 
demand that she exit the vehicle. In Buckley, passive resistance was enough 
to justify Tasering the suspect. Brown, however, unlike Buckley, was in 
police custody at the time she was Tasered. Brown was strapped into a car 
by a seatbelt, surrounded by officers, and had no intention of fleeing. Thus, 
other factors outweighed Brown’s passive resistance: a disproportionate 
use of force, a lack of warning, and a secure police custody of the plaintiff.  
The district court in Michaels v. City of Vermillion266 also ruled that it 
was unreasonable to Taser a passively-resisting suspect who was already in 
custody.267 The suspect, seventeen-year-old Matthew Michaels, was 
arrested after his mother refused to sign a juvenile complaint relating to a 
vandalism charge against Michaels.268 Initially, Michaels strenuously 
                                                                                                                     
 255. Id. at 1282. 
 256.  574 F.3d 491 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 257. Id. at 494, 496. 
 258. Id. at 494. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 496. 
 264. Id. at 496–97. 
 265. Id. at 497–98. 
 266.  539 F. Supp. 2d 975 (N.D. Ohio 2008). 
 267. Id. at 985. 
 268. Id. at 977. 
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resisted arrest by bracing himself against the doorframe of the police car.269 
This prompted the officer to Taser Michaels to get him into the car.270 
However, the officer continued to Taser Michaels even after he was 
handcuffed and placed in the back of the police car.271 The court ruled that 
Tasering Michaels after he was in the back of the police car was gratuitous 
and unreasonable because Michaels was already in custody, he was not 
accused of a severe crime, and he did not pose a significant threat to the 
officers or anyone else.272 
The district court in Brooks v. City of Seattle273 considered the suspect’s 
vulnerability when determining whether it was reasonable to Taser a 
pregnant woman.274 Police stopped the plaintiff, Malaika Brooks, for 
speeding.275 The officer attempted to arrest Brooks after she refused to sign 
the ticket.276 The officer asked Brooks to exit the vehicle, and she refused. 
When the officer attempted to drag Brooks out of the car, she resisted by 
tightly grabbing the steering wheel.277 The officer threatened Brooks with a 
Taser, and Brooks replied that she was seven months pregnant.278 O e 
officer reached over Brooks, turned off her car, and removed the keys; 
another officer Tasered Brooks three times.279 The court held that it was 
unreasonable to Taser Brooks because: the force was disproportionate to 
the minor infraction; she was seven months pregnant; she did not pose a 
threat; and she was firmly in police control.280 
In sum, Buckley shows that passive resistance alone may justify 
Tasering a suspect during an arrest or investigatory stop. With passive 
resistance, however, factors such as proportionality between the force used 
and the underlying crime, the vulnerability of the suspect, or whether the 
                                                                                                                     
 269. Id. at 978. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. at 979. There were factual disputes regarding whether the plaintiff continued to resist 
arrest after being placed in the police car, and how many times the officer Tasered Michaels after he 
had been placed into the car. Id. The officer claimed that Michaels continued to struggle and kick 
the officer in the shins, even after being placed in the car. The officer also claimed that he tased 
Michaels only “several times” after he had been placed in the back of the car. Id. Michaels asserted 
that he stopped resisting after being placed in the car, and that the officer Tasered him 
approximately twenty-five times after he had been placed into the car. Id. On summary judgment, 
the court adopted the set of facts most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 985. 
 272. Id. at 985–86. Specifically, the court held that a jury could find the officer’s conduct rose 
to a constitutional violation under the facts alleged by plaintiff. Id. at 985. 
 273.  No. C06-1681RAJ, 2008 WL 2433717 (W.D. Wash. June 12, 2008). 
 274. Id. at *5. 
 275. Id. at *1. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. at *2. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at *5–6; see also Moretta v. Abbott, 280 F. App’x 823, 824 (11th Cir. 2008) (denying 
officers qualified immunity for Tasering a six-year-old child who was holding a half-inch piece of 
glass but who was surrounded by two police officers and not threatening anyone). 
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suspect is under police control may swing the balancing test in favor of the 
suspect.  
In the case of passive resistance, there are also factors that may weigh 
in the officer’s favor when deciding whether an officer’s use of force is 
reasonable. For example, in Lowe v. City of Seattle,281 a district court held 
that it was reasonable to Taser a passively-resisting suspect who was under 
the influence of drugs, suspected of committing assault, and preparing to 
flee the scene in her truck. 282  
Passive resistance combined with aggressive behavior may also justify 
Tasering a suspect.283 In Draper v. Reynolds,284 the officer stopped the 
suspect, Stacey Draper, because the tag on his truck was not properly 
illuminated.285 Draper complained loudly about being pulled over, and he 
ignored the officer’s repeated requests that he hand over his proof of 
insurance, bill of landing, and log book.286 During the encounter, Draper 
was “belligerent, gestured animatedly, continuously paced, appeared very 
excited, and spoke loudly.”287 At some point, the officer Tasered Draper 
and arrested him.288 The court held that a single Taser use did not 
constitute excessive force where the suspect was hostile, belligerent, and 
uncooperative.289 
To summarize, active resistance will almost always justify Tasering a 
suspect—even when the suspect is already restrained, poses a minimal 
threat, or when the suspect is from a vulnerable class of persons. Passive 
resistance alone may also justify Tasering a suspect. Unlike active 
resistance, however, with passive resistance some factors may tip the 
balancing test in favor of the suspect; for example, a non-threatening, 
restrained, or vulnerable suspect. And in the case of passive resistance, 
there may also be factors that tip the balancing test in favor of the officer—
such as when the suspect poses a threat or is verbally combative.  
Although the above rules are simply stated, analyzing the 
reasonableness of an officer’s use of force is a complicated and murky 
process. The rules were formulated by closely examining the facts and 
circumstances of each case. Indeed, it is the fact-sensitive nature of the 
Fourth Amendment balancing test that confounds the excessive force 
                                                                                                                     
 281.  No. CV07-0784-JCC, 2008 WL 4083150 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 29, 2008). 
 282. Id. at *5–6. 
 283. Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Wright v. Deghetto, 
No. 5:06CV-133-R, 2008 WL 199890, at *7 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 23, 2008) (holding that it was 
reasonable for officers to Taser a suspect who was verbally combative and who mildly resisted 
officers’ attempts to handcuff him). 
 284.  369 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 285. Id. at 1272. 
 286. Id. at 1273. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 1273–74. 
 289. Id. at 1278. 
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analysis. Although the analysis allows courts to consider all of the relevant 
facts and circumstances, the analysis can lead to inconsistent rulings, and it 
does not provide clear guidance to law enforcement agencies about when 
they can lawfully use Tasers. 
V.  STATE AND LOCAL RULES REGARDING TASER USE 
A.  Police Policies Regarding Taser Use 
In 2005, the United States Government Accountability Office 
(USGAO) analyzed the Taser-related policies and procedures of the seven 
state and local law enforcement agencies that purchased and used the 
largest number of Tasers for the longest period of time.290 The survey 
found that none of the agencies had separate use-of-force policies 
governing Taser use.291 Instead, all of the agencies included Tasers in their 
existing use-of-force policies.292 The agencies based all of their use-of-
force policies on the use-of-force continuum developed by the Federal Law 
Enforcement Training Center (FLETC).293  
The FLETC use-of-force continuum provides guidance to officers about 
what level of force is appropriate based on a suspect’s actions.294 Officers 
classify a suspect’s actions according to five potential threat levels (from 
least to most threatening): (1) compliant; (2) passive resistance; (3) active 
resistance; (4) assaultive (physical injury); or (5) assaultive (serious 
physical injury / death).295 The officer responds with a level of force that is 
equal to or less than the suspect’s threat level.296 The five corresponding 
officer force levels are (from least to most forceful): (1) cooperative 
controls; (2) contact controls; (3) compliance techniques; (4) defensive 
tactics; and (5) deadly force.297 For example, if the subject is compliant, the 
officer should respond with cooperative controls such as voice 
commands.298 On the other hand, if the officer perceives a risk of serious 
physical injury or death, the officer may respond with deadly force. 
The agencies surveyed by the USGAO each placed Tasers at one of 
three levels on the continuum.299 Two agencies allowed officers to use 
                                                                                                                     
 290. USGAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 2. The agencies surveyed were the Austin, Texas, 
Police Department; the Ohio Highway Patrol; the Orange County, Florida Sheriff’s Department; the 
Phoenix, Arizona Police Department; the Sacramento, California Police Department; the 
Sacramento, California Sheriff’s Department; and the San Jose, California Police Department. Id. 
 291. Id. at 7. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 7–8. 
 295. Id. at 8. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. at 9. 
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Tasers when they perceived a suspect’s actions as potentially harmful—i.e. 
assaultive (level four threat).300 Four agencies allowed officers to use 
Tasers when the suspect was actively resisting but not attacking the officer 
(level three threat).301 Only one agency allowed officers to Taser passively 
resisting suspects (level two threat).302  
A survey by the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California 
(ACLU-NC) yielded results similar to those of the USGAO survey.303 
ACLU-NC studied the Taser use policies of fifty-four law enforcement 
agencies in central and northern California.304 The study found that 
California law enforcement agencies permit Taser use “under a wide range 
of circumstances.”305 Most commonly, the agencies permitted Taser use 
when the subject was violent or potentially violent.306 
The ACLU-NC survey found that only four agencies had policies that 
warned against or prohibited Tasering a suspect multiple times.307 Only ten 
agencies (19%) had policies regulating Taser use against passively resisting 
suspects.308 Only fourteen agencies (26%) regulated Taser use against 
suspects who were handcuffed or restrained.309 And regarding vulnerable 
suspects, nineteen agencies (35%) regulated Taser use against the elderly; 
ten agencies (19%) regulated Taser use against juveniles; and twenty-three 
agencies (43%) regulated Taser use against pregnant women.310 
Both the USGAO and ACLU-NC studies show that there are no 
universal policies governing Taser use by law enforcement. And there are 
few policies that protect passively resisting, vulnerable, or restrained 
suspects.   
B.  State Laws Regulating Taser Use by Law Enforcement 
New Jersey is the only state to ban Taser use by anyone—including law 
enforcement.311 Florida and Georgia are the only states with statutes that 
                                                                                                                     
 300. Id.; see also ACLU, TASER STUDY, supra note 38, at 12. At this threat level, the agencies 
also allow the officers to use such tactics as night sticks and batons. USGAO REPORT, supra note 
26, at 9. 
 301. USGAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 9. 
 302. USGAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 9. 
 303. ACLU, TASER STUDY, supra note 38, at 12.  
 304. Id. at 1. The ACLU-NC surveyed a total of seventy-nine police departments in central and 
northern California and found that fifty-six used Tasers. Id. Of the fifty-six that employed Tasers, 
fifty-four provided their Taser use policies to the ACLU-NC. Id. 
 305. Id. at 12. 
 306. Id. Violent corresponds to physical injury (level four of the FLETC use-of-force 
continuum), and potentially violent corresponds to active resistance (level three of the FLETC use-
of-force continuum). 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. at 12–13. 
 309. Id. at 14. 
 310. Id. at 13. 
 311. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-3(h) (2009). 
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specifically regulate Taser use by law enforcement.312 The Georgia statute 
provides that Tasers will “be used for law enforcement purposes in a 
manner consistent with established standards and with federal and state 
constitutional provisions.”313 Thus, Georgia essentially adopts the federal 
standard.  
The Florida statute provides that law enforcement officers may only 
Taser a suspect during “an arrest or a custodial situation during which the 
person who is the subject of the arrest or custody escalates resistance to the 
officer from passive physical resistance to active physical resistance.”314 
Further, the Florida statute specifies that the actively resisting suspect must 
either have the “apparent ability to physically threaten the officer or others” 
or be “preparing or attempting to flee or escape.”315 Thus, the Florida 
statute requires that the suspect be actively resisting, and that the suspect 
must either: (1) have the apparent ability to physically threaten the officer 
or others; or (2) be attempting to flee. 
The Florida statute regulates Taser use in a manner that is consistent 
with the FLETC use-of-force continuum. By limiting Taser use to actively 
resisting suspects, the Florida statute effectively places Taser use on level 
three of the FLETC use-of-force continuum. This helps provide guidance 
to law enforcement officers because officers are already familiar with the 
FLETC use-of-force continuum. The statute also helps ensure 
proportionality between the suspect’s actions and the officer’s use of force. 
Finally, the standard is within the bounds of what is considered reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.316 
VI.   IMPROVING THE LAWS GOVERNING TASER USE BY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
To determine whether a police officer’s use of force is reasonable, the 
Supreme Court asks lower courts to perform a cumbersome balancing test 
that weighs the suspect’s interests against the government’s interests with 
careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each case.317 The 
consequence is that the Supreme Court’s § 1983 excessive force 
jurisprudence provides little guidance to officers in the field about when 
and what type of force is appropriate during an arrest or investigatory 
stop.318 Law enforcement officers must conduct a rigorous fact-based 
analysis of prior case law to determine whether a particular use of force is 
                                                                                                                     
 312. FLA. STAT. § 943.1717(1)(a)–(b) (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 35-8-26 (2009). 
 313. GA. CODE ANN. § 35-8-26 (2009). 
 314. FLA. STAT. § 943.1717(1) (2009).  
 315. Id. § 943.1717(1)(a)–(b). 
 316. See supra Part IV (discussing that active resistance will almost always justify police use 
of a Taser as reasonable, while the line for passive resistance is not so clear).  
 317. See supra Part III.B. 
 318. Id. 
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reasonable.319 One problem with this approach is that it becomes 
exceedingly difficult for law enforcement officers to draft excessive force 
policies that comply with the Fourth Amendment. A second problem is that 
when faced with a novel set of circumstances, an officer may never be 
completely certain whether his use of force is reasonable. 
After conducting the necessary factual analysis of § 1983 case law, we 
can formulate some general rules for determining when Tasering a suspect 
is considered reasonable.320 Generally, even a low degree of active 
resistance, such as pulling away from an officer’s grasp, will justify 
Tasering a suspect.321 Active resistance may justify Tasering a suspect even 
when the suspect is already restrained or when the suspect is from a 
vulnerable class of persons.322  
Passive resistance may also justify Tasering a suspect. 323 Unlike active 
resistance, however, Tasering a passively resisting suspect may not be 
reasonable when the suspect is already restrained,324 from a vulnerable 
class of persons,325 or when the force is disproportionate to the underlying 
crime.326 
These general rules provide officers with a great deal of latitude to 
control suspects who physically resist or refuse to comply with an officer’s 
demands. Given the safety concerns with Tasers, however, it is prudent to 
question whether the rules adequately protect suspects. Although Taser use 
by law enforcement may result in an overall decrease in suspect injuries,327 
suspects could be given more protection without compromising Taser 
effectiveness. 
It may also be important to consider proportionality when crafting laws 
and policies that govern Taser use by law enforcement. When officers use 
force that is disproportionate to the threat, it can spark fear, anger, and 
                                                                                                                     
 319. See supra Part IV. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Edwards v. City of Martins Ferry, 554 F. Supp. 2d 797, 806–07 (2008); Campos v. City 
of Glendale, No. CV-06-610-PHX-DGC, 2007 WL 4468722, at *3–4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 14, 2007). But 
see Roberts v. Manigold, 240 F. App’x 675, 678 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 322. Edwards, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 807–08; Johnson v. City of Lincoln Park, 434 F. Supp. 2d 
467, 478–80 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
 323. Buckley v. Haddock, 292 F. App’x 791, 794 (11th Cir. 2008). 
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even protests328 that degrade law enforcement’s relationship with the 
community. It runs contrary to many people’s expectations about what 
constitutes reasonable force to allow officers to Taser passively-resisting 
suspects who pose no threat to the officer or others.  
Ideally, laws governing Taser use should provide suspects more 
protection and provide officers specific guidance about when and how 
Tasers may be used. The federal judiciary could accomplish these goals by 
including clear, bright-line rules as part of the holding for each case. 
Bright-line rules would solve the specificity problem of current excessive 
force jurisprudence and create a national standard governing Taser use by 
law enforcement. It is unlikely, however, that such bright-line rules are 
forthcoming, given that the Supreme Court has said, “[T]he test of 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise 
definition.”329 
This void in federal law creates a window of opportunity for states to 
create their own laws governing Taser use by law enforcement. Because 
current federal laws do not heavily restrict Taser use by law enforcement, 
states are free to adopt more restrictive standards while still staying within 
the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment. Although this would not lead to 
uniform national standards, it would allow the states to fulfill their classic 
roles as laboratories for experimentation to determine what works and what 
does not.   
Florida was the first state to enact a statute that specifies when law 
enforcement officers can Taser a suspect. Florida law limits Taser use to 
situations where the suspect is ether actively resisting and fleeing or 
actively resisting and has the apparent ability to harm the officer.330 By 
limiting Taser use to situations where the suspect is actively resisting, 
Florida law helps to ensure that the officer’s force is proportional to the 
threat posed.  
The law does not, however, account for situations where a passively-
resisting suspect poses an apparent threat to officers or others. For 
example, imagine a situation where a diminutive officer confronts a large 
suspect who has a long history of violent crimes. Further, imagine that the 
officer informs the suspect that he is under arrest, and the suspect walks 
towards the officer, points, and exclaims, “There is no way I’m going back 
to jail!” In this hypothetical, the suspect has not actively resisted the 
officer, yet the suspect clearly poses a threat. In this situation, using a Taser 
to subdue the suspect could very well be warranted. Thus, a better rule 
would be that officers may only use a Taser when: (1) the suspect is 
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 329. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 
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actively resisting; or (2) the suspect is passively resisting but has the 
apparent ability to physically threaten the officer or others.  
A law governing Taser use should also contain specific provisions that 
protect suspects. For example, a provision that limits the number of times a 
suspect can be Tasered would play an important role in protecting suspects 
from excessive Taser use by law enforcement. Cases of fatalities following 
Taser use involve a disproportionate number of multiple shock 
incidents.331 And if a suspect has not complied after being shocked three or 
four times, it is unlikely that Tasering could be considered effective law 
enforcement.332 Thus, a provision that limits the number of times a suspect 
can be Tasered would protect suspects without substantially hindering law 
enforcement officers. 
It would also be advisable to include a provision that prohibits officers 
from Tasering vulnerable suspects such as the elderly, minors below a 
certain age, pregnant women, or those with known or apparent health risks 
such as drug intoxication or heart disease. And, if after Tasering a suspect 
police determined that the suspect belongs to an at-risk category, a medical 
evaluation should be provided.333 Finally, a law governing Taser use 
should include a provision that requires all officers equipped with Tasers to 
complete a Taser-use training course. 334 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s excessive force jurisprudence sets a flexible, 
nonspecific standard for determining whether a law enforcement officer’s 
use of force is reasonable. This standard allows officers broad discretion 
for determining what level of force is appropriate during an arrest or 
investigatory stop. Consequentially, it is unclear when Tasering a suspect is 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  
The United States needs specific laws governing Taser use by law 
enforcement. These laws should be designed to protect citizens by limiting 
multiple Taser shocks and prohibiting officers from Tasering vulnerable 
individuals.  
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